OpenClaw: A Self-Hosted Agent Runtime Needs a Clear Trust Boundary
What OpenClaw's own security guidance says about local-first agents, trusted operators, tools, credentials, multi-user isolation, and crypto-adjacent workflows.
CL
CryptoLV EditorialEditorial team
·4 min read
Review and sources
Reviewed 2026-08-17 by CryptoLV Editorial. Next review: 2026-11-17.
- OpenClaw: Gateway security documentation opens in a new tab
Supports: OpenClaw documents a personal, trusted-operator model, warns that it is not a hostile multi-tenant boundary, and recommends separate gateways or hosts for separated trust boundaries.
- OpenClaw: Security policy opens in a new tab
Supports: The project states that the model is not a trusted principal and places security boundaries in host and config trust, authentication, tool policy, sandboxing, and exact execution approvals.
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications opens in a new tab
Supports: Prompt injection and excessive agency are relevant risks for tool-enabled LLM agents; untrusted content must not receive authority over connected systems.
Add progress to your track
